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Speakers adapt gestures to addressees’ knowledge:
implications for models of co-speech gesture
Alexia Galatia,b* and Susan E. Brennana
aDepartment of Psychology, Stony Brook University, SUNY, Stony Brook, NY 11794-2500, USA; bDepartment
of Psychology, University of Cyprus, PO Box 205371678, Nicosia, Cyprus
(Received 30 May 2012; final version received 4 April 2013)
Are gesturing and speaking shaped by similar communicative constraints? In an experiment, we teased apart
communicative from cognitive constraints upon multiple dimensions of speech-accompanying gestures in sponta-
neous dialogue. Typically, speakers attenuate old, repeated or predictable information but not new information. Our
study distinguished what was new or old for speakers from what was new or old for (and shared with) addressees. In
20 groups of 3 naive participants, speakers retold the same Road Runner cartoon story twice to one addressee and
once to another. We compared the distribution of gesture types, and the gestures’ size and iconic precision across
retellings. Speakers gestured less frequently in stories retold to Old Addressees than New Addressees. Moreover, the
gestures they produced in stories retold to Old Addressees were smaller and less precise than those retold to New
Addressees, although these were attenuated over time as well. Consistent with our previous findings about speaking,
gesturing is guided by both speaker-based (cognitive) and addressee-based (communicative) constraints that affect
both planning and motoric execution. We discuss the implications for models of co-speech gesture production.
Keywords: audience design; gesture; dialogue; common ground; spontaneous speech; storytelling; partner-
specific adaptation; communication
Gesturing is ubiquitous during communication. Like
speech, gestures can be expressive in multidimensional
ways, encoding both propositional and imagistic
information (McNeill & Duncan, 2000), representing
abstract information (e.g., Mu¨ller, 1998), adding
emphasis (McClave, 1994), and conveying arousal
and emotion (de Meijer, 1989; Wallbott, 1998). Ges-
tures and speech have been proposed by some to
emerge from the same planning process and to form
an integrated message in communication (e.g., Clark,
1996; Goodwin, 2000; Kendon, 1994; McNeill, 1985,
1992). Gestures are semantically co-expressive with
speech (e.g., McNeill, 1985, 1992), pragmatically
integrated with speech (Kelly, Barr, Church, & Lynch,
1999), and temporally coordinated with speech
(Mayberry & Jaques, 2000; McClave, 1994).
Thus, speech and gesture are coordinated in com-
plex ways in spontaneous communication; in this paper
we consider how speech and co-speech gestures are
shaped by the same speaker- and addressee-related
factors all the way through formulation and articula-
tion. Current models of gesture production are usually
based on research that explores how gestures facilitate
the speakers’ own cognitive processes, such as lexical
retrieval (Krauss, Chen, & Gottesman, 2000) or
packaging information for speaking (Kita & O¨zyu¨rek,
2003). Fewer models address how gestures may be
produced with the addressee’s needs in mind (de Ruiter,
2000; McNeill & Duncan, 2000), and such models do
not specify how contextual or addressee-specific in-
formation is represented such that it can affect planning
processes. Although cognitive (for-the-speaker) and com-
municative (for-the-addressee) functions of gestures
have long been acknowledged (Bavelas & Chovil,
2000; Kendon, 1994), current frameworks do not
account for how cognitive and communicative con-
straints shape gesture planning jointly.
In the current study, we extend our prior work on
effects of cognitive and communicative constraints on
speaking (Galati & Brennan, 2010) to examine effects
of cognitive and communicative constraints on gestur-
ing at different grains of production (encoding seman-
tic content vs. executing surface form). In particular, we
ask whether for-the-speaker and for-the-addressee
constraints affect the planning and motoric execution
of gestures just as they affect the planning and
articulation of speech (Galati & Brennan, 2010). By
considering how cognitive and communicative effects
emerge at different junctures in planning, we aim to
elucidate how these two expressive modalities interact.
*Corresponding author. E-mail: galati@ucy.ac.cy
Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 2014
Vol. 29, No. 4, 435451, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01690965.2013.796397


























We begin by reviewing research on both cognitive and
communicative factors that have been shown individu-
ally to constrain gesture production, along with the
processing stages these factors have been shown to
affect. Then we discuss how current theories of gesture
production can accommodate communicative and
cognitive factors and identify the processes for which
these theories posit (explicitly or implicitly) that speech
and gesture planning interact. Finally, we present
our study and its implications for the planning and
production of co-speech gesture.
Factors shown to constrain gesture production
Gestures have been shown to be guided by speakers’
cognitive needs, including facilitating lexical retrieval,
managing cognitive load and organising information
into constituents appropriate for speaking; in other
words, gesturing helps people speak. Speakers pre-
vented from gesturing become more dysfluent, produ-
cing more filled pauses and slower speech (Morsella &
Krauss, 2004; Rauscher, Krauss, & Chen, 1996) and
their descriptions become less vivid (Rime´, Schiatura,
Hupet, & Ghysselinckx, 1984). Moreover, when speak-
ers have rehearsed their speech, they produce fewer
gestures than when they speak spontaneously (Chawla &
Krauss, 1994).
Gesture production also helps speakers manage
cognitive load. When performing dual tasks, such as
explaining a math problem while remembering a string
of letters, speakers recall more letters when they are
permitted to gesture than when they are not (Goldin-
Meadow, Nusbaum, Kelly, & Wagner, 2001). Pointing
gestures also help manage cognitive load, facilitating
performance on counting tasks for both young children
(Alibali & DiRusso, 1999) and adults (Carlson, Avraa-
mides, Cary, & Strasberg, 2007). Speakers gesture more
frequently when describing objects that are difficult to
encode verbally or have to be described from memory
(Morsella & Krauss, 2004). They also gesture more
when having to figure out what to describe first or when
resuming a task after performing another task using the
same cognitive resources (Melinger & Kita, 2007).
The way in which information is packaged in speech
also influences gesturing, presumably because gesturing
helps with organising information into syntactic con-
stituents. Explanations elicit different patterns of
gestures than descriptions, even when controlling for
the semantic content of speech; explanations, which
are more constrained and complex than descriptions,
elicit more non-redundant, representational gestures 
gestures that depict semantic content by virtue of
handshape, placement and motion (Alibali, Kita, &
Young, 2000). Also, differences in gesture mirror cross-
linguistic differences in how the manner and path of
motion events are encoded in the sentence, either
within verb forms or as adverbials (Kita & O¨zyu¨rek,
2003).
However, co-speech gesture is guided not only by
these cognitive factors, but also by communicative
factors, which involve taking into account the informa-
tional needs or perspectives of addressees. For instance,
visual co-presence (whether conversational partners
share the same environment and can see one another)
constrains gesturing. Speakers generally gesture less
frequently when addressees cannot see them (Cohen,
1977; Cohen & Harrison, 1973). More recently, there
have been several demonstrations that the visibility
between conversational partners affects some types of
gestures more than others. In a study by Bavelas,
Chovil, Lawrie, and Wade (1992), there were increased
‘‘interactive’’ gestures (associated with managing the
dialogue) when partners were visually co-present; in
another study by Alibali, Heath, and Myers (2001)
there were increased representational gestures. When
speakers can see their partner they also adapt their
pointing gestures, being more likely to point as their
distance from the target display increases (Bangerter,
2004). Speakers also produce larger gestures, more
gestures that were non-redundant with speech, more
interactive gestures and more verbal references to their
gestures when talking face-to-face than when talking
over the telephone or into a tape recorder (Bavelas,
Gerwing, Sutton, & Prevost, 2008). Finally, speakers
adapt their gestures according to the space they share
with their addressees, as determined by their relative
locations; during expressions of motion events, the
directionality of gestures accompanying the words in
and out depends on the directionality of these words in
the shared space (O¨zyu¨rek, 2000, 2002).
Yet another factor that constrains gesture produc-
tion is common ground (or what interlocutors mutually
know). Reference to information already in common
ground is often either attenuated or omitted. For
instance, speakers describing the location of large,
salient targets were more likely to express size informa-
tion in gestures to addressees with whom they had not
previously studied displays of the targets than to those
with whom they had (Holler & Stevens, 2007). Also,
speakers encoded more semantic features in their
gestures when they had not watched the narrated
clip together with an addressee than when they had
(Holler & Wilkin, 2009). Similarly, in a study where
speakers retold the same story repeatedly either to the
same confederate addressee or to new confederate
addressees, gesture rates decreased with each retelling
to the same addressee but not across retellings
to different addressees (Jacobs & Garnham, 2007).
Common ground can also affect qualitative aspects of


























gesture; speakers describing toys to addressees who had
played with the same toys produced gestures that were
less complex, less precise, and less informative com-
pared to speakers describing the toys to addressees who
had played with a different set of toys (Gerwing &
Bavelas, 2004).
Linguistic context can also constrain gesture pro-
duction. Levy and McNeill (1992) observed that
utterances encoding information that is new or the-
matic for future discourse (e.g., introductory mentions
of a character) involves more complex referring
expressions in speech and more gesturing than does
already-mentioned or presupposed information. Indeed,
gestures are less likely to occur with presupposed
information, such as zero and unstressed pronoun
references, and more likely to occur with more complex
noun phrases and predications (McNeill & Levy, 1993).
In addition to informational factors, less-studied
factors such as arousal, emotion and individual differ-
ences could affect gesture planning as well.
In sum, quite a variety of constraints have been
shown, at least individually, to affect the formulating of
preverbal messages into co-speech gestures, whereas
much less is known about constraints on gestures’
motoric execution (although common ground has been
shown to be one of these constraints; Gerwing &
Bavelas, 2004). A model of co-speech gesture produc-
tion should ultimately account for how cognitive, social
and contextual factors affect both the planning and
execution of gestures, as well as for how gesture and
speech planning may be co-constrained.
Theories of gesture production
Current theories of gesture planning can be distin-
guished by the assumptions they make about: (1)
modularity or architectural barriers in planning, that
is, whether computations performed during a given
planning process are independent from and therefore
unaffected by those performed elsewhere in the system,
(2) the points in planning at which speech and gesture
interface and (3) the extent to which communicative
factors can affect gesture planning.
Some theories that can be classified as modular
take as a starting point Levelt’s (1989) information-
processing model of speech production, which involves
cascading stages for conceptualising, formulating and
articulating; a gesture module is linked at some stage to
a speech module (e.g., de Ruiter, 2000; Krauss et al.,
2000). One such proposal by Krauss et al. (2000),
focusing on how gestures facilitate lexical retrieval,
links the gesture module to the speech module at the
level of working memory and at Levelt’s formulator
stage (where words are retrieved and filled into
syntactic forms). According to this Lexical Gestures
proposal (Krauss et al. 2000), spatio-motoric features
selected in working memory cross-modally prime
semantic features, facilitating the access of lemmas
and word forms. This modular theory focuses solely on
speaker-internal constraints (namely, lexical access)
and does not make predictions about how commu-
nicative or contextual factors could affect gesture
planning (see de Ruiter, 2000, for a related criticism).
Another modular proposal by McNeill 2000, the
Sketch Model, differs from Lexical Gestures (Krauss
et al., 2000) both in its assumptions about the function
of gesture and the stages at which the speech and
gesture modules interface. Rather than viewing gestures
as artefacts of lexical retrieval, the Sketch Model posits
that gesture serves as ‘‘a communicative device from
the speaker’s point of view’’ (de Ruiter, 2000, p. 292).
Gestures are initiated and linked to speech production
at Levelt’s conceptualiser stage (before filling in lexical
items in syntactic constituents at the formulator
stage), such that a preverbal message and a representa-
tion with imagistic and spatio-temporal information
(the ‘‘sketch’’) emerge simultaneously. As the preverbal
message is sent to the speech formulator, the gesture
planner constructs a motor programme based on the
‘‘sketch’’ to send to the motor execution unit. At the
articulation/execution stage, speech and gesture pro-
ceed ballistically since there is no interaction between
the two modalities at lower levels of processing.
Synchrony is instead achieved only at the onset of the
message, when the gesture planner sends a message to
the conceptualiser that speech formulation can be
initiated. In the Sketch Model, communicative and
contextual factors can affect gesture production only if
represented during higher-level planning, for instance
by keeping track of anaphoric references in the form of
a discourse record during the conceptualisation of the
message (McNeill 2000, p. 289).
Another proposal that presupposes Levelt’s (1989)
information-processing model but that extends the
coordination of speech and gesture through the for-
mulation phase is Kita and O¨zyu¨rek’s (2003) Interface
Hypothesis. This proposal aims to explain how gestures
are constrained not only by the semantic properties of
their referents, but also by the possibilities of linguistic
encoding. On this view, what corresponds to Levelt’s
Conceptualiser is divided into a Communication Plan-
ner and a Message Planner. The Communication
Planner takes into account the ‘‘communicative inten-
tion’’ (i.e., performs the ‘‘macro-planning’’ of Levelt’s
Conceptualiser), determining what information should
be expressed, in roughly what order, and by which
modality. The Communication Planner’s resulting out-
put is then sent to the Message Generator and an
Action Generator  a general mechanism for generat-


























ing both gestures and instrumental actions. The
Message Generator selects propositions for formulat-
ing in speech based on the communicative goals and
context (i.e., performs the ‘‘micro-planning’’ of Levelt’s
Conceptualiser); links between the Message Generator
and the Action Generator enable coordinating what
information to encode in speech and in gesture.
Bidirectional feedback between the Speech Formulator
and Message Generator can account for gestures being
shaped by constraints for linguistic encoding (via the
Message Generator’s link to the Action Generator).
The Interface Hypothesis focuses mainly on cognitive
and linguistic constraints  namely, on how the
demands for packaging information in speech affect
the distribution of semantic (particularly, spatiomoto-
ric) features in gesture. Communicative factors are not
explicitly addressed, although presumably they can be
handled by the Communication Planner. As with the
Sketch Model, no coordination is posited between
the motoric articulation of speech and gesture.
Although it is intuitively appealing to consider
gesture planning from the perspective of distinct stages
of speech planning, there is evidence of interaction and
fine-grained coordination between speech and gesture
during virtually every point in their production. For
instance, gestures are synchronous with tone group
nuclei (McClave, 1994), and are suspended during stut-
tering (Mayberry & Jaques, 2000) and before speech
repairs (Seyfeddinipur, 2006). To reconcile the archi-
tecture of co-speech gesture production with these
findings would require additional links between articu-
latory and monitoring processes across the speech and
gesture that are not currently posited by the modular
accounts.
Non-modular accounts tend to be less explicit about
how speech and gesture planning is coordinated, and
instead focus on accounting for effects of the discourse
record, common ground and other speaker-external
constraints. In one such theory, gestures are thought
to arise from representations  known as ‘‘growth
points’’  encoding imagery and linguistic content that
mark significant contrasts in the immediate context
(McNeill & Duncan, 2000). Although Growth Point
Theory highlights the contribution of speaker-external
constraints, it does not clarify what constitutes a
significant contrast in the unfolding discourse context
and does not make specific predictions about how
multiple constraints affect gesture production.
The framework closest to ours, Hostetter and
Alibali’s (2008, 2010) Gesture as Simulated Action
framework, is agnostic about any architectural barriers
in gesture production and permits multiple factors to
influence production. According to this framework, a
representational gesture is produced when activation
exceeds a certain threshold during neural simulation of
the action event that is to be described. So a speaker’s
likelihood of expressing a simulated action as a gesture
depends not only upon the neural activation arising
from simulating the action, but also upon the current
threshold for a gesture. This threshold may be affected
by additional neural factors (e.g., connections between
motor and premotor areas), cognitive factors (e.g.,
working memory constraints) or aspects of the com-
municative situation (e.g., whether what is being
described is difficult for the audience). Nonetheless,
the Gesture as Simulated Action framework does not
make explicit predictions about the gesture’s motoric
execution. The motoric execution of a gesture presum-
ably could be affected by analogue features of the
mental simulation underlying it, but in their current
formulation Hostetter and Alibali do not specify
whether adjustments in the gesture threshold can shape
not only whether a gesture is produced (adapting the
gesture rate, a quantitative adaptation), but also the
gesture’s shape or size (qualitative adaptations).
Beginning with Hostetter and Alibali’s (2008, 2010)
view that several factors can constrain gesture produc-
tion simultaneously, we aim to extend their framework
by examining how the effects of both cognitive
and communicative factors may be distributed across
different grains of speech and gesture planning.
The current study
Spontaneous speaking is flexible enough to be influ-
enced by addressees’ needs, not only during con-
ceptualisation and formulation but also during
articulation, as long as such needs are simple and
known to the speaker (Galati & Brennan, 2010). In the
current study, we aim to discover whether co-speech
gesture is shaped at the same grains and by the same
constraints as is speech. Previously we examined
measures of spoken content (number of narrative
events realised, number of words, amount of detail,
and lexical perspective) and articulation (the duration
and intelligibility of lexically identical expressions) for
the same speaker across three retellings of the same
story (with the second and third retellings being to
either a new addressee or to the same addressee as the
first retelling) (Galati & Brennan, 2010). This design
offered the advantage of teasing apart the speaker’s
perspective from the addressee’s, enabling direct com-
parisons of stories under Speakernew-Addresseenew,
Speakerold-Addresseeold and Speakerold-Addresseenew
conditions. For all these speech measures except lexical
perspective and duration, we found that stories retold
to Old Addressees were attenuated compared to those
retold to New Addressees. In the current study we
coded and analysed the co-speech gestures from the


























same speech corpus to examine the distribution of
for-the-speaker and for-the-addressee effects on ges-
tures for both planning (as reflected by the distribution
of different types of gestures) and motoric execution
(as reflected by adaptation in the size and iconic
precision of gestures).
A study by Jacobs and Garnham (2007) used a
design similar to ours, but focused only on quantitative
aspects (measuring gesture rates) rather than their
forms. In that study, speakers retold comic strip stories
in four conditions, two of which are of interest here:
speakers repeated one story three times to the same
addressee, and they repeated another story three times,
but each time to one of three different addressees.
Speakers gestured less frequently with each retelling to
the same addressee but not across retellings to different
addressees, demonstrating that addressee’s knowledge
affected gesture formulation. These findings are rele-
vant to our study in that they isolate for-the-addressee
effects; however, our study goes beyond Jacobs and
Garnham’s by (a) measuring adaptation not only in
gesture frequency but also in motoric execution, (b)
considering adaptation in gesture alongside adaptation
in speech and (c) not only dissociating the perspective
of the speaker from the perspective of the addressee,
but also allowing direct comparisons between the same
narrative retold to the same addressee (Speakerold-
Addresseeold) versus to a new addressee (Speakerold-
Addresseenew).
Design
Speakers told a story to two addressees a total of three
times: after telling the story for the first time to a naive
addressee, they retold the same story to the same
addressee and then to a new naive one, or vice-versa.
Therefore, the status of information (old vs. new)
varied across narrations (Speakernew-Addresseenew,
Speakerold-Addresseeold and Speakerold-Addresseenew).
By dissociating the perspective of the speaker from the
perspective of the addressee through retellings to the
same or to a new addressee, we could tease apart
the effects of cognitive and communicative factors on
gesturing. Adaptations in gesture made while retelling
the story to a new addressee could be clearly attributed
to be for-the-addressee and were not confounded by the
speakers’ own perspective (see Keysar, 1997, for a
related discussion). The counterbalancing of the
addressee’s identity in the second and third retellings
was done to account for potential hypermnesia (in-
creased recall with repeated attempts; see Payne, 1987,
for a review) and other order effects (such as fatigue or
forgetting) that might wash out any effect of partner-
specific adaptation.
As a measure of content-related adaptation in
gesture production, we focused on the distribution of
different gesture types. We reasoned that encoding
the intended message into a co-speech gesture should
involve selecting whether to depict certain semantic
features in analogue fashion (with a representational
gesture), or else to not depict any such features and
instead mark emphasis (with a beat gesture) or aspects
of the dialogue process (with a metanarrative gesture).
In other words, selecting a gesture type should be part
of gesture formulating or planning. To examine sur-
face-form-related adaptation, we considered the size of
a gesture and its iconic precision. Adaptation in size
and iconic precision that cannot be attributed to
changes in the narrative content (which we kept
constant) should reflect adjustments in motoric
execution.
Predictions
Alongside our previous findings for speech (Galati &
Brennan, 2010), we were able to test predictions about
how the two modalities are coordinated  specifically,
whether they are subject to the same patterns of
adaptation all the way from planning to articulation.
If adaptation in gesturing parallels that in speaking,
this would support speech and gesture production
being closely coordinated during both planning and
articulation (as opposed to proceeding ballistically, or
without coordination once each modality is launched).
If on the other hand adaptation in gesturing does not
parallel that in speaking, this would suggest that, even
if speech and gesture share representations during
conceptualising (e.g., de Ruiter, 2000), their formulat-
ing and articulating may unfold more independently.
Consistent with our previous findings for speech, we
predicted that since representational gestures encode
semantic content, they would particularly be sensitive
to addressees’ informational needs, and thus their rate
would be attenuated more in retellings to old addres-
sees than to new addressees. We also predicted that the
rate of metanarrative and beat gestures would increase
more in retellings to old addressees than to new
addressees, consistent with the findings that the rate
of interactive gestures increases as common ground
increases (e.g., when narrating in dialogue rather than
in monologue, Bavelas, Chovil, Coates, & Roe, 1995).
That addressee knowledge can affect gesture frequency
is also supported by Jacobs and Garnham’s (2007)
findings, although their task did not reveal reliable
differences in the distributions of representational and
other types of gestures. If speakers are more likely to
produce fewer gestures when retelling stories to Old
Addressees than to New Addressees, this would
parallel the adaptation we found for utterance planning


























and would suggest that speech and gesture formulation
are closely coordinated.
Seeing that few studies have examined qualitative
adjustments in gestures (e.g., Bavelas et al., 2008;
Gerwing & Bavelas, 2004; Kuhlen, Galati, & Brennan,
2012), and none have considered them in conjunction
with articulatory adjustments in speech, our predic-
tions about the motoric execution of gestures were
more exploratory. Motoric adjustments in gestures
could parallel those in speech, such that speakers are
more likely to attenuate their gestures’ size and preci-
sion when retelling stories to Old Addressees than to
New Addressees. This would suggest that speech
and gesture articulation interface in a way that per-
mits them both to be shaped by partner-specific
information.
Alternatively, adaptation in gestures’ motoric execu-
tion may pattern differently than spoken articulation.
This would suggest that the two modalities involve
more independently planned or encapsulated processes.
Such a pattern would be expected with the ‘‘Dual
Process Model’’ (proposed for speaking by Bard &
Aylett, 2001; Bard et al., 2000), in which automated
processes like articulation are encapsulated from com-
municative constraints and default to being egocentric,
whereas other more inferential processes like the
planning of referring expressions can be guided by
the partner’s needs. This modular ‘‘Dual Process
Model’’, extended to gesture production, would predict
that the distribution of gesture types, reflecting a more
inferential process, may be influenced by for-the-
addressee factors (e.g., the addressee’s identity), but
the motoric execution of gestures should be influenced
only by for-the-speaker factors, with gestures attenuat-
ing their size and iconic precision with each retelling
as the stories became more accessible to speakers.
Although our findings on spoken articulation do not
support such encapsulation within speech planning
(Galati & Brennan, 2010), it is possible that gesture
processes are structured differently than in speech and
involve more independent computations.
Method
In triads of naive participants, one person acted as
speaker and the other two as addressees. Speakers
watched a cartoon and narrated it three times: twice to
the same addressee (A1) and once to the new addressee
(A2); the order of addressees (same vs. new addressee)
in the second and third narrations was counterbalanced
(A1-A1-A2 or A1-A2-A1). We examined adaptation in
terms of the number of gestures, the distribution of
gesture types and the relative size and iconic precision
of gestures produced by speakers across retellings.
Participants
Sixty-nine students from Stony Brook University were
grouped into 23 triads. Speakers were all native English
speakers; addressees were all fluent in English. Three of
the triads were excluded due to idiosyncrasies of the
speaker or addressee.1 Of the remaining 60 participants,
20 served in the role of the speaker and 40 in the role of
the addressee. Forty-five of these participants were
female and 15 were male. In none of the 20 triads did
participants know each other in advance. Speakers were
recruited separately from addressees to ensure their
native English speaker status. Addressees were ran-
domly assigned to the roles of A1 (the first addressee to
hear the speaker tell the story) and A2. Participants were
compensated with research credit that could be used to
fulfil a requirement in a psychology course.
Materials
A Looney Tunes animated cartoon without dialogue
(entitled ‘‘Beep Beep’’) starring Road Runner and Wile
E. Coyote was used to elicit narratives.2 The cartoon
was edited for length such that it had four distinct
episodes, corresponding to four attempts of Coyote to
capture Road Runner, 3 min and 10 sec long.
Procedure
All participants were told that the study investigated
storytelling and memory and that the addressees, upon
hearing the stories narrated by the speakers, would be
tested for their memory of the stories at the end of the
session. The expectation of a memory test for addres-
sees provided a reason to pay attention to the story and
a rationale for telling or being told the same story
twice. Speakers watched the cartoon alone on a
computer. After watching it twice, they moved to
another room to narrate the story three times. They
were informed in advance that they would be narrating
the story twice to one of the addressees and once to the
other (but not informed who would hear the story twice
and in what order). Speakers were asked to narrate in
as much detail as possible each time. Addressees were
told that they would hear the story once or twice and
told to remember as much of the story as possible for
the upcoming memory test. They were also told that
they could freely comment or ask questions for
clarification during the narration. Only one addressee
was present in the room during each storytelling
session, which was videotaped (with both partners
visible) with a digital camcorder. The experimenter was
present off to the side during the sessions to supervise
the recording; speakers and addressees were told to
face each other and ignore the experimenter and
camera. When the storytelling sessions were completed,
participants were told that there would not in fact be a


























memory test for the addressees, and they were all
debriefed.
Transcribing
All three narrations of the Road Runner cartoon for
each triad were transcribed in detail by the first author.
To be able to compare the narrations within and across
speakers, we created a script for 85 narrative elements
for the Road Runner cartoon. A narrative element
referred to a proposition or set of propositions forming
a sub-event that advances the plot of the story (see
Galati & Brennan, 2010, for more details on creating
the script and transcribing speech).
Coding
The 20 narrative elements most frequently mentioned
by speakers were selected for coding co-speech gestures.
Appendix 1 provides a list of these elements. For a
narrative element from a given speaker to be included
in our coding, it had to be realised in all three retellings
in the speech transcript. Out of the possible 400 triplets
of narrative elements (20 for each of 20 speakers),
59 were excluded because in one or more narrations the
narrative element was omitted. Thus, a total of 341
triplets of narrative elements were included in our
coding; 162 of these triplets came from narration
order A1-A1-A2 and 179 came from narration order
A1-A2-A1.
Video clips of these 341 triplets of narrative elements
were excised from the digital recordings. The onsets
and offsets of the videos were adjusted so that gestures
associated with the narrative elements were included in
their entirety, regardless of whether their beginning or
end overlapped partially with spoken descriptions of
other narrative elements. On each resulting clip, a video
effect was applied in Final Cut Express HD to block
out the addressee in the video, and each video file was
given an uninformative label; these steps were taken to
ensure that the coding of speakers’ gestures was blind
to addressee identity, behaviour or knowledge status.
Video clips of narrative elements were coded in
triplets for their gestures’ relative size and iconic preci-
sion, and were coded individually for gesture number
and types. Before coding, the first author identified all
irrelevant hand movements that were not gestures (e.g.,
self-adaptors, such as scratching nose, adjusting glasses)
and made notations regarding their form and onset in
the coders’ rating sheets. This was necessary because
the coding of relative gesture size and iconic precision
was made without sound and it may thus not have been
clear whether those movements were meant to repre-
sent a character’s action.
Distribution of gesture types
Two coders categorised each gesture in each video of
the 341 triplets as belonging to one of these types:
(1) Representational, (2) Metanarrative, (3) Beats or
(4) Combination. To classify gestures, coders consid-
ered the semantic features that were encoded in gesture
(or a lack of semantic features in the case of beat
gestures), the accompanying speech (unlike for the size
and precision coding) and the original events within the
animated cartoon.
Representational gestures (also known as iconics,
McNeill, 1992, or illustrators, Ekman & Friesen, 1969)
depict semantic content by virtue of handshape, place-
ment and motion and often represent the movement of
characters or properties of objects. Representational
gestures, for our purposes, also included pointing
gestures that were used to set up or locate characters
or objects in gestures space (referred to as abstract
deictic gestures at the narrative level, Cassell &
McNeill, 1991).
Metanarrative gestures included gestures that facil-
itate dialogue (referred to as interactives by Bavelas et
al., 1992, e.g., presenting a single hand with cupped
fingers directed towards the addressee while saying
‘‘you know’’) or support discourse cohesion (referred
to as cohesives by McNeill, 1992). Metanarrative
gestures included metaphoric pointing gestures
(referred to as abstract deictic gestures at the metanar-
rative level, Cassell & McNeill, 1991), such as pointing
towards the right while saying ‘‘in the Coyote’s next
attempt’’.
Beats were simple, rhythmic gestures that did not
encode semantic content (e.g., Alibali et al., 2001;
McNeill, 1992). In our coding we considered beat
gestures to be distinct from other metanarrative
gestures known as interactive gestures, because inter-
active gestures have been shown to be affected by
common ground manipulations (Bavelas et al., 1992,
Exp 2; Bavelas et al., 1995), whereas beat gestures on
their own have been shown not to be (Alibali, Heath, &
Myers, 2001). Coders distinguished metanarrative and
beat gestures by considering both the accompanying
speech and the gestures’ kinetics and form. Gestures
were generally classified as beats when they were
biphasic with a small motion range (i.e., simple ‘‘up-
and-down’’ movement of the wrist or fingers), while
lacking a clear semantic relationship to speech and
instead emphasising (usually stressed) accompanying
words. On the other hand, gestures were classified as
metanarrative when they were non-representational
gestures but triphasic (involving a preparation, stroke3
and retraction phase), with a more varied form and
greater range, and could be tied to the accompanying


























speech or the established discourse context (e.g., to
referents established in gesture space).
Finally, we created the category of Combination
gestures for those gestures that were either (a) repre-
sentational gestures substantially attenuated to the
point that most iconic features were lost or (b) repre-
sentational gestures on which beat or other metanar-
rative gestures had been superimposed. An example of
a combination gesture from our corpus is an interactive
gesture involving ‘‘hand-flailing’’ (with spread fingers
and loose wrists) to indicate problems with lexical
retrieval or uncertainty when accessing the word anvil,
superimposed on a representational gesture of Coyote’s
hands holding an anvil.
For the 1023 videos (of the 341 triplets), the 2 coders
agreed on 92% of the cases on the total number of
gestures produced in the videos, 89% of the cases on the
number of representational gestures, 94% of the cases
on the number of metanarrative gestures, 97% of the
cases on the number of beat gestures and 89% of the
cases on the number of combination gestures. Most of
the disagreements concerned the classification of
representational versus combination gestures, which is
not surprising since combination gestures by definition
included representational features. The first author’s
coding of gesture types was used in the data analyses.
Measuring relative gesture size
Two coders (the first author and a different under-
graduate research assistant than the one who coded
gesture types) watched the 341 triplets of videos
without sound and rated the relative size of the gestures
produced by the speaker (both did 100% of the coding).
Gesture size was defined as the amount of space that
the speakers’ hands spanned when gesturing. This
involved both the displacement of the speakers’ hand
during gesturing (e.g., the length of the upwards
trajectory of a speaker’s hand when representing
Coyote being propelled into the air by the tightrope)
and also, in the case of two-handed gestures, the space
between the speakers’ hands (e.g., the space between
two hands when the speaker is representing Coyote
holding an anvil). When judging gesture size, coders
considered the largest displacement of the hand in one-
handed gestures or the largest distance between the
hands in two-handed gestures during the entire gesture
rather than just during the gesture stroke. The coders
recorded the relative size of gestures across the three
triplets by entering their judgement (using the video
labels) for each of the three on a 17 scale with 0.5
point increments. If the speaker did not produce a
gesture while describing a particular event, gesture size
was coded as 0. Since speakers’ self-adaptors (e.g.,
adjusting glasses) were annotated in the coders’ rating
sheets in advance, coders excluded them from judge-
ments of the gestures’ size.
In determining the relative ordering, the coders
could watch the three videos within a triplet in any
order and as many times as they needed to. If they
judged that the speaker’s gestures in two or all three of
the videos used the same amount of space, they could
assign the same rating to those videos. When a speaker
clearly repeated a gesture (when the same motion was
performed repeatedly without the hands returning to
rest), coders did not consider the gesture space used in
subsequent movements to increase the size of the
gesture. However, if one of the repeated gestures was
larger than the initial one, the size of the largest
repetition determined the coders’ judgement.
To assess reliability between the two coders, we
calculated the proportion of video triplets for which
both coders ranked the three videos in the same order
for gesture size; this occurred in 83% of the cases. In
another 12% of the cases the coders agreed on which
video included contained gestures of either the largest
or smallest size, but disagreed on the relative ranking of
the remaining two videos. Only in 5% of the cases did
the coders make completely different judgements about
the relative ranking of the three videos in terms of
gesture size. Because the undergraduate coder was also
blind to the experimental hypotheses, his judgements
were used in the data analyses.
Measuring relative gesture precision
After coding the 341 triplets for gesture size, the
two coders who coded gesture size coded the same
triplets for iconic precision relative to the action in the
original cartoon. Iconic precision was defined as the
similarity between a gesture from a narration and the
original cartoon event. For each triplet, the coders
watched the part of the original cartoon that was
described in that triplet and then judged the three
associated narrative clips (without sound). As with
coding gesture size, the coders rated iconic precision for
each video on a 17 scale with 0.5 point increments. If
the speaker did not produce any gestures in a video, the
degree of iconic precision for that video was coded as 0.
Coders could also assign a 0 rating when they judged
that the speakers’ gestures did not convey any of the
semantic information in the stimulus clip. This was the
case, for example, when speakers produced beat
gestures, which could not be mapped onto any
representational aspect of the cartoon stimulus.
Coders could replay both the original cartoon
segment and the narratives as many times they wanted
in order to make these judgements. If they judged
that the speaker in two or all three videos of a triplet
produced gestures with the same degree of iconic


























precision, they could assign the same rating. When a
speaker clearly repeated a gesture, the coders consid-
ered the repetition matching the event in the stimulus
most closely to determine their judgement of iconic
precision for that video.
Reliability for iconic precision coding was assessed
as it was for relative gesture size coding. In 85% of the
cases the two coders ranked the three videos identically;
in another 10%, the coders agreed on which video
included the highest or lowest degree of iconic preci-
sion, but disagreed on the relative ranking of the
remaining two videos. Only in 6% of the cases did
they make rank the three videos completely differently
in terms of iconic precision. As before, the under-
graduate coder’s judgements were used in the data
analyses.
Analyses
Analyses were 32 analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
with knowledge status (Speakernew-Addresseenew,
Speakerold-Addresseeold or Speakerold-Addresseenew)
as a within-subjects factor and addressee order
(A1-A1-A2 vs. A1-A2-A1) as a between-subjects factor.
To examine the distribution of gesture types, the
ANOVA also included gesture type as a factor (repre-
sentational, beats, metanarrative and combination).
Two planned contrasts were examined: the first com-
pared the speaker’s production for the first telling to
A1 and the retelling to A2new (Snew vs. Sold), and the
second compared the speaker’s production for the
retelling to A1 and the telling to A2 (A1old vs.
A2new), both of which were old for the speaker. The
first contrast was speaker-centred, focusing on whether
speakers attenuated their gesture production over time
regardless of the knowledge status of the addressee.
The second contrast was addressee-centred, focusing
on whether the speaker’s production differed depend-
ing on the addressee’s knowledge status. For each
result, we report two analyses: F1 is the analysis by
subjects (for which means are computed for triads of
participants) and F2 is the analysis by items (for which
means are computed for script elements).
Results
Adaptation in the distribution of gesture types
In this narrative task, speakers produced primarily
representational gestures: overall, the corpus included
1553 representational gestures, 213 metanarrative ges-
tures, 50 beat gestures and 362 combination gestures.
Gesture frequency differed significantly across these
gesture types, F1 (3, 54)164.54, pB.001; F2 (3, 57)
108.52, pB.001. Table 1 shows the distribution of
gesture types according to the addressee’s knowledge.
The distribution of gesture types depended on addres-
see knowledge, at least when generalising across speak-
ers, as suggested by a reliable interaction of the two
factors by subjects, F1 (6, 108)4.69, pB.001; F2 (6,
114).72, ns.
Given our previous findings on partner-specific
adaptation in speech planning (Galati & Brennan,
2010), and in so far as the two modalities are coordi-
nated during planning, we expected that content-
related adaptation in gesture planning would reflect
sensitivity to addressees’ knowledge. To test our pre-
diction that representational gestures would be parti-
cularly sensitive to addressees’ informational needs, we
first examined whether there was a lower rate of repre-
sentational gestures than other gestures in retellings to
the same addressee relative to a new addressee. The
for-the-addressee effect was greater for representational
gestures than for metanarrative gestures (F1 (1, 18)
13.82, pB.01; F2 (1, 19)9.59, pB.01), beats
(F1 (1, 18)10.32, pB.01; F2 (1, 19)5.89, pB.05)
or combination gestures (F1 (1, 18)11.13 pB.01; F2
(1, 19)8.55, pB.01).
Because representational gestures were the most
common type in our corpus and the most likely to be
semantically informative for addressees, we conducted
focused ANOVAs on their rate alone to examine
whether it depended on addressees’ knowledge. If
addressees’ informational needs affect gesture planning,
speakers should produce more representational gestures
per narrative element in retellings to addressees for
Table 1. Distribution of gesture types: Means (and SDs) for
number of representational, metanarrative, beat and combi-








A1-A1-A2 1.65 (1.25) 1.49 (1.11) 1.63 (1.28)
A1-A2-A1 1.53 (0.99) 1.30 (1.08) 1.53 (1.20)
Total 1.59 (1.12) 1.39 (1.10) 1.58 (1.23)
Metanarrative
A1-A1-A2 0.15 (0.46) 0.19 (0.48) 0.17 (0.41)
A1-A2-A1 0.24 (0.57) 0.26 (0.65) 0.22 (0.59)
Total 0.20 (0.53) 0.23 (0.58) 0.20 (0.51)
Beat
A1-A1-A2 0.03 (0.17) 0.05 (0.24) 0.06 (0.28)
A1-A2-A1 0.03 (0.21) 0.07 (0.35) 0.06 (0.28)
Total 0.03 (0.19) 0.06 (0.30) 0.06 (0.28)
Combination
A1-A1-A2 0.35 (0.71) 0.37 (0.65) 0.31 (0.63)
A1-A2-A1 0.38 (0.76) 0.36 (0.81) 0.35 (0.75)
Total 0.37 (0.73) 0.36 (0.74) 0.33 (0.69)
Total
A1-A1-A2 2.19 (1.54) 2.10 (1.27) 2.17 (1.39)
A1-A2-A1 2.18 (1.46) 1.99 (1.57) 2.15 (1.61)
Total 2.18 (1.50) 2.04 (1.43) 2.16 (1.51)


























whom the information is new compared to addressees
for whom the information is old. As shown in Table 2,
the difference in the number of representational gestures
per narrative element between retellings to A1old and
A2new was significant by subjects but not by items
(a marginal for-the-addressee effect), whereas the num-
ber of representational gestures per narrative element
did not differ significantly between the tellings to A1old
and A2new (no for-the-speaker effect).
There were no for-the-speaker or for-the-addressee
differences among the other types of gestures. We had
hypothesised that the rate of metanarrative gestures
might increase in retellings to old addressees than to
new addressees, given evidence that interactive gestures
become more frequent as common ground increases
(Bavelas et al., 1995); however, metanarrative gestures
showed only a numerical increase in the retelling to the
same addressee relative to the retelling to a new
addressee that was not statistically reliable. Represen-
tational gestures seem to drive the effects observed for
the total number of gestures produced per narrative
element. As shown in Table 1, speakers gestured less
overall in the retelling to A1 than in the first telling to
A1 and the retelling to A2.
Alternative measure of gesture rate
So far we have considered gesture rate in terms of the
number of gestures per narrative element, without
normalising for the number of words. In our previous
data-set on partner-specific effects in speaking, adapta-
tion for the subset of 20 narrative elements selected for
the current study showed the same pattern as that for
the entire narration (Galati & Brennan, 2010): for the
20 elements, speakers used fewer words in the retelling
to the same addressee (A1old vs. A2new: F1 (1, 18)
13.49, pB.01; F2 (1, 19)7.14, pB.05), but not in
the retelling to a new addressee (A1new vs. A2new:
F1 (1, 18)1.87, p.19, F2 (1, 19)2.19, p.16).
However, for those 20 elements, dividing the number of
gestures per narrative element by the number of words
produced for that element made the for-the-addressee
effect for representational gestures no longer reliable
(F1 (1, 18)1.76, p.20; F2 (1, 19)1.72, p.20).
This suggests that adaptive processes attenuate both
speech and gesture in parallel. Moreover, even though
the number of representational gestures per narrative
element did not reliably differ in the tellings to A1new
and A2new (reported earlier), this comparison, when
normalised for words, becomes marginally reliable by
subjects (F1 (1, 18)3.94, p.06, F2 (1, 19)1.77,
p.20). This confirms that it is more appropriate to
compare adaptation in the number of gestures per unit
of semantic content than per word, especially since here
we ensured that these most frequently mentioned
narrative elements were realised in all three retellings.
Dividing the number of gestures by the number of
words can obfuscate any partner-specific (or other)
attenuation in gesture4 because it assumes that both
speech and gesture encode meaning compositionally
and sequentially, whereas gesture in fact encodes
meaning globally, with different components (such as
handshape and movement) giving rise to a single
gesture (McNeill, 1992). For these salient elements,
retellings to the same addressee were on average less
than a word shorter than retellings to new addressees
(11.80 words per narrative element to A1old vs. 12.28 to
A1new and 12.77 to A2new). Although the reduction in
the number of words in the retelling to A1 was a
reliable, it is so small that it is unlikely that the parallel
reduction in the number of representational gestures
per narrative element is due to a significant loss in
opportunities to gesture (given that representational
gestures typically unfold over longer stretches of
speech).
Adaptation in gesture size
Speakers’ use of gesture space was constrained by
partner-specific knowledge: speakers adapted the size
Table 2. Partner-specific contrasts for the frequencies of different types of gestures. Significant effects are highlighted.
For-the-speaker effect For-the-addressee effect
Speakernew-Addresseenew vs. Speakerold-Addresseenew Speakerold-Addresseeold vs. Speakerold-Addresseenew
Representational F1 (1, 18)0.07, ns F1 (1, 18)16.76, pB.01
F2 (1, 19)0.31, ns F2 (1, 19)0.93, ns
Metanarrative F1 (1, 18)0.00, ns F1 (1, 18)1.53, p.23
F2 (1, 19)0.05, ns F2 (1, 19)2.23, p.15
Beat F1 (1, 18)2.10, p.17 F1 (1, 18)0.02, ns
F2 (1, 19)2.31, p.15 F2 (1, 19)0.08, ns
Combination F1 (1, 18)0.10, ns F1 (1, 18)0.27, ns
F2 (1, 19)1.39, ns F2 (1, 19)1.30, p.27
Total F1 (1, 18)0.16, ns F1 (1, 18)3.26, p.09
F2 (1, 19)0.31, ns F2 (1, 19)2.03, p.17


























of their gestures according to whether addressees had
heard the story before or not. Gesture size was rated
3.20 (SD1.18) for the first telling, 2.79 (SD1.28)
for the retelling to the same addressee and 3.06 (SD
1.23) for the retelling to a new addressee. Figure 1
illustrates the gesture size ratings for addressee orders
A1-A1-A2 and A1-A2-A1. For both addressee orders,
speakers attenuated their gesture size significantly more
when retelling the story to the same addressee than to a
new addressee (see Table 3).
In addition to attenuating gestures for-the-addres-
see, there was also a clear for-the-speaker effect, with
speakers attenuating gesture size based on their own
experience with the story: gestures produced in the
telling to A2 used less space compared to gestures
produced in the first retelling to A1 (Table 3). In other
words, after the first telling speakers attenuated the size
of their gestures, but less so if the retelling was to a new
addressee than to an old addressee.
The interaction between addressee’s knowledge
status and addressee order was reliable by items but
not by subjects, F1 (2, 36)1.94, p.16; F2 (2, 38)
5.01, pB.05. When speakers retold the stories to a
knowledgeable addressee (A1old), they attenuated the
size of their gestures more in narrative order A1-A2-A1
than in order A1-A1-A2. As Figure 1 shows, gesture
size for the retelling to the knowledgeable addressee
A1, when this immediately followed the first telling,
was only slightly smaller than the retelling to the naive
addressee A2; this numerical difference was not reli-
able, F1 (1, 9)1.47, ns; F2 (1, 19)1.10, ns. However,
when the third retelling was to the knowledgeable A1,
gesture size was significantly smaller compared to the
retelling to the naive A2, F1 (1, 9)10.94, pB.01; F2
(1, 19)42.72, pB.001. Gestures directed at A2 were
of similar size whether they appeared the second or
third time the speaker told the story, F1 (1, 18)0.004,
ns; F2 (1, 19)0.14, ns. And for retellings to A1, the
difference in gesture size across orders A1-A1-A2 and
A1-A2-A1 was reliable only by items, F1 (1, 18)0.49,
ns; F2 (1, 19)7.19, pB.05. In other words, the
interaction of addressee’s knowledge and addressee
order makes sense in light of speakers adapting gesture
size both for their addressees and for themselves. In
order A1-A2-A1, attenuation across the second and
third retellings was reliable and consistent with both an
effect of partner-specific adaptation and an effect of
practice. But in order A1-A1-A2, the two factors
worked against each other, resulting in less of a dip
in the black bar than the grey bar for A1old in Figure 1.
Another possibility is that switching back and forth
between addressees may have made the identity of the
addressee more salient than switching addressees only
once, leading to the numerically greater attenuation in
gesture size for retellings to A1 in order A1-A2-A1.
Adaptation in gesture precision
Speakers adapted the iconic precision of their gestures
in similar ways as they did gesture size, with both for-
the-addressee5 and for-the-speaker effects (see Table 3).
The mean rating for the iconic precision of gestures was
3.24 (SD1.17) for the first telling, 2.80 (SD1.26)
for the retelling to the same addressee and 3.05 (SD
1.18) for the retelling to a new addressee. Figure 2
illustrates the mean ratings for the amount of iconic
precision with which speakers gestured in the addressee





























Figure 1. Mean rating for gesture size judgements (ranging from 1
to 7); bars represent standard errors.
Table 3. Partner-specific contrasts for ratings of gestures’ size and iconic precision.
Contrasts Gesture size Iconic precision
For-the-speaker effect:
Speakernew-Addresseenew vs. new F1 (1, 18)4.29, p.05 F1 (1, 18)8.98, pB.01
Speakerold-Addressee F2 (1, 19)21.54, pB.001 F2 (1, 19)18.51, pB.001
For-the-addressee effect:
Speakerold-Addresseeold vs. F1 (1, 18)10.54, pB.01 F1 (1, 18)10.90, pB.01
Speakerold-Addresseenew F2 (1, 19)33.44, pB.001 F2 (1, 19)29.86, pB.001


























orders, gestures in retellings to the same addressee were
less precise than to a new addressee. As with gesture
size, there was also a for-the-speaker effect: speakers
were less precise when gesturing in a retelling to a new
addressee than in their first telling to a new addressee.
For gesture precision, there was a reliable interaction
between the addressee’s knowledge status and addres-
see order, F1 (2, 36)3.38, pB.05; F2 (2, 38) 4.49,
pB.05. When speakers retold stories to the same
addressee, they attenuated their gestures in terms of
iconic precision more so in the narrative order A1-A2-
A1 (in the third retelling) than in the narrative order
A1-A1-A2 (in the second retelling). This is not surpris-
ing, as in order A1-A2-A1, the third telling may have
been shaped in the same direction by both for-the-
speaker and for-the-addressee attenuation (or possibly
by the increased salience of addressee’s identity in order
A1-A2-A1 due to the successive switching). As with
gesture size, the for-the-addressee effect (the difference
between iconic precision in the retellings to A1 and A2)
was therefore more pronounced in this order than in
order A1-A1-A2, where the old partner is in the second
telling. As Figure 2 shows, relative to the retelling to
A2, iconic precision in the retelling to A1 was more
attenuated for order A1-A2-A1 than in order A1-A1-
A2. In other words, when the retelling to A1 was the
third telling, the gestures were judged to be signifi-
cantly less precise relative to the retelling of A2, F1 (1,
9)10.27, pB.05; F2 (1, 19)26.80, pB.001. On the
other hand, when the retelling to A1 immediately
followed the first telling, the speakers’ gestures to A1
were judged to be numerically slightly less precise than
the retelling to A2, but for this order the for-the-
addressee difference was not reliable, F1 (1, 9)1.42,
ns; F2 (1, 19)0.20, ns. Gestures directed at A2 were of
comparable iconic precision whether they occurred in
the second or third time the speaker told the story, F1
(1, 18)0.08, ns; F2 (1, 19)0.18, ns. For retellings to
A1, the difference in the gestures’ iconic precision seen
across orders A1-A1-A2 and A1-A2-A1 was reliable
only by items, F1 (1, 18).53, ns; F2(1, 19)5.47,
pB.05. That is, gestures to A2 did not differ in their
iconic precision whether they were produced in the
second or third telling, and neither did gestures to A1.
The interaction of the addressee’s knowledge and the
addressee order is consistent with speakers adapting
their gestures’ precision both for their addressees and
for themselves. Although gestures in retellings to A2
were more precise than to A1 in order A1-A2-A1, they
were not reliably so in the other order, A1-A1-A2. The
attenuation in precision observed across the three
retellings in order A1-A2-A1 appears to have been
cancelled out by having a new partner on the third
telling in order A1-A1-A2.
We also examined the relation between the iconic
precision of gestures and their size. These qualitative
dimensions of gestures were highly correlated: for the
first telling, Pearson’s r.60, pB.001; for the retelling
to A1, Pearson’s r.68, pB.001; and for the retelling
to A2, Pearson’s r.65, pB.001. These correlations
were not driven simply by narrative elements for which
no gestures were produced (where both iconic precision
and size had sizes of zero in the data-set); they remained
reliable even when these instances were filtered out
(first telling, Pearson’s r.55, pB.001; retelling to
A1, Pearson’s r.60, pB.001; and retelling to A2,
Pearson’s r.61, pB.001).
Addressees’ feedback
Speakers accrue information about their addressee’s
informational needs not only from prior experience but
also from verbal and nonverbal cues from the addressee
as the dialogue unfolds (see Brennan, Galati, &
Kuhlen, 2010, for discussion). Indeed, in a study in
which we dissociated the speakers’ prior expectations
about the addressees’ attentiveness from their addres-
sees’ feedback we found that speakers used both
sources of information in a highly interactive manner
to adapt their gestures (Kuhlen et al., 2012; see also
Kuhlen & Brennan, 2010). To explore the possibility
that the addressees’ feedback shaped speakers’ gestur-
ing in the current study, we coded in the transcript of
each narration the number of turns, or instances in
which addressees made comments, asked clarification






























Figure 2. Mean rating for iconic precision judgements (ranging
from 1 to 7); bars represent standard errors.


























mm-hmm, uh-huh, yeah), made expressive exclamations
(oh, ah), or laughed.
Consistent with addressees’ knowledge status, A1
provided overt feedback in an average of 7.15 turns
(SD7.34) the first time they heard the story (A1new),
and 3.05 turns (SD5.00) the second time they heard
the story (A1old), F (1, 18)4.74, pB.05. Addressees
who heard the story only once (A2 new) provided
feedback in an average of 3.95 turns (SD4.57);
although the numerically lower amount of feedback
by A2new compared to A1new was unexpected, this
difference was not reliable, F (1, 18)2.27, p.15. It
is not clear whether A2’s (numerically) attenuated
feedback was related to the speaker’s gestures (which
were somewhat attenuated in size and precision but not
in number relative to the first telling) or possibly to
A2’s awareness that the speaker had told the story to
A1 already. In any event, feedback from A1old and
A2new did not differ (F (1, 18).39, ns), and so
feedback could not have been solely responsible for
the speaker’s reliably larger, more frequent and more
precise gestures to A2new.
Discussion
Our findings show that both speech and gesture
production are constrained by speakers’ awareness of
their addressees’ informational needs, and that the two
modalities are coordinated during production. The
partner-specific adaptation we observed extends from
early phases in gesture planning (influencing whether
to gesture and what information to encode), all the way
through motoric execution (determining qualitative
aspects of a gesture). Speakers tended to produce
marginally fewer representational gestures in retellings
to old addressees than to new addressees. And in
executing these gestures, they were significantly more
likely to attenuate their relative size and their iconic
precision to old addressees than to new addressees.
These findings for gesture are consistent with our
previous findings from the same corpus for speech:
addressee knowledge shapes both utterance planning
and articulation. In Galati and Brennan (2010), the
number of events realised, words, amount of detail, and
intelligibility of lexically identical expressions were all
attenuated in speech directed to old addressees relative
to speech directed to new addressees.
In addition to finding strong evidence of partner-
specific adaptation in the current study, we also found
attenuation for-the-speaker in gestures’ motoric execu-
tion. Relative to the first telling, speakers attenuated
the size and iconic precision of gestures in retellings to
new addressees. In other words, after the first telling,
speakers attenuated both gesture size and iconic
precision, but less so if the retelling was to a new
addressee than to an old addressee. Attenuation in the
two addressee orders further highlights that motoric
execution of gestures appears to be constrained by both
for-the-speaker and for-the addressee information.
The interaction of these effects with partner order
(illustrated by the differences in height between the
middle pair of bars in both Figures 1 and 2) was likely
due to the fact that for-the-speaker and for-the-
addressee influences worked in concert for the retelling
to A1 and in opposition for the retelling to A2. For the
retelling to A1, both factors work in concert since
attenuation is compatible both with the story being
accessible to speakers and with the addressee’s knowl-
edge status. With both factors contributing to attenu-
ating gestures in the retelling to A1, gesture size and
iconic precision scores were lower in order A1-A2-A1
(where the story is maximally accessible to speakers in
the third retelling) than A1-A1-A2. On the other hand,
for the retelling to A2, the two factors work in
opposition: attenuation is driven by the story being
accessible to the speaker but is inappropriate given the
addressee’s knowledge status. We found that A2’s
knowledge status curbed further attenuation arising
from the order of the retelling: although relative to the
first telling gestures to A2 were attenuated, they were
not attenuated more in a third retelling than in a
second retelling (the difference between orders A1-A1-
A2 and A1-A2-A1 was not reliable). It is also possible
that switching partners twice during the experiment
(order A1-A2-A1) made the identity of the partner
more salient than switching partners only once (order
A1-A1-A2), such that the attenuation to A1 in order
A1-A2-A1 was greater than in order A1-A1-A2.
The evidence from the current study, taken together
with that from Galati and Brennan (2010) using the
same experimental corpus, suggests that speech and
gesture production are coordinated: in both modalities,
speakers adapted their behaviour for-the-addressee,
during both planning and articulation. In addition,
the current study found adaptation in the motoric
execution of gesture for-the-speaker, even though there
was no reliable for-the-speaker adaptation in the
intelligibility of lexically identical expressions in Galati
and Brennan (2010). Why should this be so? One
possibility is that gesturing is more sensitive than
speaking to motor practice effects (another way of
looking at for-the-speaker attenuation). For instance,
the delay in between retellings of a particular narrative
event may have been long enough to swamp any
practice effects for repeated words but not for repeated
gestures. Another possibility is that the presence of a
for-the-speaker effect in the current study and absence
of one in Galati and Brennan (2010) can be attributed
to semiotic differences between speech and gesture.


























Gestures, unlike spoken language, are not composi-
tional, and the mappings they represent between form
and meaning are not arbitrary, so their communicative
potential may be less threatened by attenuation: speak-
ers may be freer to attenuate their gestures without
significant cost to addressees’ comprehension. If that is
the case, gestures may be more susceptible than speech
to for-the-speaker effects. Despite the differences we
found in for-the-speaker attenuation of speech vs.
gestures, the two modalities must interface during their
articulation to account for their fine-grained temporal
coordination (e.g., Mayberry & Jaques, 2000; McClave,
1994; Seyfeddinipur, 2006).
Our findings go beyond those of Jacobs and
Garnham (2007), who used a similar design but focused
on partner-specific adjustments only in quantitative
terms (gesture rate). Jacobs and Garnham’s (2007)
findings converge with ours in that they demonstrate
that gesture frequency is constrained by addressees’
knowledge. In their study, gesture rate across retellings
to different addressees did not differ significantly,
whereas it decreased with each retelling to the same
addressee. In our study, measuring within-speaker
adaptation in surface form afforded a more nuanced
understanding of the speaker-specific and addressee-
specific factors shaping not only gesture planning, but
also the gestures’ motoric execution.
Unconfounding for-the-speaker and for-the-
addressee factors and examining them simultaneously
in the same experimental design goes beyond previous
attempts to model gesture production that focused on a
single cognitive or communicative constraint. The
adaptation we report here cannot be accounted for by
proposals that gestures are driven egocentrically, for
instance, only for facilitating the speakers’ lexical
retrieval (Krauss, Dushay, Chen, & Rauscher 1995;
Krauss, Morrel-Samuels, & Colasante, 1991; Krauss et
al., 2000). The Lexical Gestures framework of Krauss
and colleagues would predict that the rate of gesturing
would simply decrease across the three tellings (either
gradually or all at once), since with each retelling words
are more accessible to the speaker. Instead, we found
enhanced gesture rates with addressees who were hear-
ing stories for the first time, establishing that the effect is
shaped by addressees’ needs.
Our findings are consistent with mounting evidence
that gestures are not produced exclusively for either
speaker or addressee (see Bavelas & Chovil, 2000, for
discussion). These findings are also consistent with
Hostetter and Alibali’s (2008, 2010) Gesture as
Simulated Action framework, which posits that several
factors can constrain gesture production simulta-
neously. The Gesture as Simulated Action framework
enables multiple constraints, including communicative
ones, and can adapt the threshold that needs to be
exceeded for a gesture to be generated. Nonetheless, it
does not currently specify whether adjustments in the
gesture threshold can affect qualitative aspects of a
gesture, although such refinements could be made to
account for the kind of motoric adaptation we report
here. For example, to the extent that increased common
ground between partners raises the threshold for pro-
ducing a gesture, when speakers retell (upon mentally
simulating) events to old addressees, they should be not
only less likely to produce a gesture representing an
event (relative to new addressees), but also less likely to
motorically realise the gesture as vividly or as precisely.
Our findings also fit the assumptions of a constraint-
based model of speech and co-speech gesture produc-
tion in which different sources of information 
including that from common ground, discourse context
and within-sentence structural and lexical biases  are
weighted depending on their salience and relevance
to the task and are integrated probabilistically and
in parallel to shape production (e.g., Jurafsky, 1996;
MacDonald, 1994; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995).
Critically, in constraint-based models there is no need
to posit information encapsulation or architectural
barriers in the planning process. Instead, adaptation
across different grains of processing reflects probabil-
istic constraints on information processing. This means
that tailoring utterances to an addressee’s needs can
occur when information about those needs is available
early enough (see Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Brown-
Schmidt & Hanna, 2011; Hanna, Tanenhaus, &
Trueswell, 2003; Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004). That
both ‘‘inferential’’ processes (like message planning)
and ‘‘automatic’’ ones (like spoken articulation and the
motoric execution of gestures) are adapted to addres-
sees’ knowledge runs contrary to modular proposals
that consider ‘‘automatic’’ processes to be necessarily
encapsulated from and unaffected by partner-specific
information (Bard & Aylett, 2001; Bard et al., 2000).
To adapt to addressees, speakers need not elaborately
represent their addressee’s informational needs. Instead,
they may represent addressees’ needs as simple, pre-
computed constraints (often captured by binary alter-
natives, e.g., my addressee has heard this story before, or
not) that combine probabilistically (Brennan & Hanna,
2009; Galati & Brennan, 2010). Such a constraint-based
model of partner-specific adaptation is supported by the
many demonstrations for adjustments in gesture based
on whether the addressee can see the speaker (e.g.,
Alibali et al., 2001; Bangerter, 2004; Bavelas et al., 1992,
2008; Cohen & Harrison, 1973), where their addressee is
seated (O¨zyu¨rek, 2000, 2002), and whether the addressee
can see or has seen what the speaker is describing
(Gerwing & Bavelas, 2004; Holler & Stevens, 2007;
Holler & Wilkin, 2009; Jacobs & Garnham, 2007). As
long as such distinctions about a partner’s knowledge


























are salient or previously computed  as global variables
available continuously in processing  they could be
integrated in parallel with other constraints to prob-
abilistically impact even ‘‘automatic’’ processes like
spoken articulation or the motoric execution of gestures.
We consider such constraints to be flexible; over the
course of a dialogue, local cues such as a partner’s
feedback could also reinforce or update a constraint-
based representation of the partner’s knowledge or
needs (Brennan et al., 2010; Kuhlen et al., 2012).
Finally, we caution that making claims about
functional differences between gesture types would be
premature based solely on our findings. Like other
studies that have used a cartoon elicitation task (e.g.,
Alibali et al., 2001), we found clear partner-specific
effects for representational gestures (the most frequent
type of gesture in narrations of motion events).
Partner-specific constraints may impact other types of
gestures as well, with different effects to the extent that
those gestures serve different functions. The partner-
specific pattern we had hypothesised for metanarrative
gestures (i.e., an increase in the retellings to the same
addressee) might emerge in a different elicitation task.
Conclusion
This study distinguished speaker-specific from addressee-
specific influences on gesturing in a narrative task,
finding strong evidence that gesturing is shaped by
both. There was no evidence that speakers’ perspectives
take priority over addressees’ in the speakers’ narra-
tions. This finding contrasts with other proposals that
speakers default to egocentric behaviour, adjusting to
any distinct needs of addressees only later, as a repair
(e.g., Horton & Keysar, 1996; Pickering & Garrod,
2004). This joint influence of for-the-speaker and for-
the-addressee factors is consistent with models that
consider gesture to be shaped by multiple constraints
(Hostetter & Alibali, 2008, 2010). In conjunction with
previous findings on partner-specific adaptation in
speaking (Galati & Brennan, 2010), the current find-
ings clarify how multiple factors can guide sponta-
neous utterance planning and execution in both speech
and gesture. The strong for-the-addressee effects we
have found across the two modalities suggest that
speech and gesture are closely coordinated from
the earlier phases of planning, all the way through
articulation. As long as communicative constraints are
simple enough (e.g., my addressee has heard this story
before, or not), salient and relevant to the task at hand,
they can be integrated with other sources of informa-
tion to affect the planning and execution of utterances
with little or no discernable cost to the speaker.
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Notes
1. One triad was excluded because the speaker had a broken
arm, which impeded his gestural production. A second
triad was excluded because the speaker misunderstood
the task and provided a nearly frame-by-frame report of
the cartoon’s progression instead of narrating a story; the
speaker ran out of time and did not complete the task.
The third triad was excluded because one of the
addressees had his eyes closed throughout the speaker’s
narrations (presumably trying to visualise the cartoon
events and not falling asleep!). According to Bavelas et
al. (1992) the rate of gesturing, especially for interactive
gestures, is significantly affected by visual availability,
and as such the speaker’s gestural production when
narrating to this listener might have been affected.
2. Additional cartoons were also narrated, one with Tweety
and Sylvester and one with Bugs Bunny and Yosemite
Sam. The third cartoon was dropped from the task after
the first six triads, because narrating a total of nine
stories (three for each cartoon) was often too tiring for
the speakers. The narrations of the second cartoon were
not analysed.
3. The stroke is the expressive and dynamic part of the
gesture, bearing its semantic content, and it is optionally
preceded by a preparation phase, during which the hands
move from rest towards the space where the stroke is
executed, and a retraction phase, during which the hands
return to rest (McNeill, 1992).
4. A study that normalised the number of gestures by words
to assess partner-specific adaptation yielded the para-
doxical result that gesture frequency increased when
speakers and addressees had common ground (had
both watched the story told by the speaker) compared
to when they did not, even though speakers produced
fewer words and fewer gestures when telling the story to
an addressee who had seen the story than to one who had
not (Holler & Wilkin, 2009).
5. Since coders assigned a single score to the size and iconic
precision of all gestures for a given narrative element, the
effects we observed could conceivably be due to speakers
producing more beats and metanarrative gestures rather
than attenuating the precision of their representational
gestures. However, attenuation in these qualitative di-
mensions appears to be driven by representational
gestures, since the frequency of beats and metanarrative
gestures did not differ across retellings. Although the
frequency of beats and of metanarrative gestures in-
creased numerically after the first telling (see Table 1),
this increase was not reliable. In particular, the for-the-
addressee effect was not significant for either metanarra-


























tive gestures (F1 (1, 18)1.53, p.23; F2 (1, 19)2.23,
p.15) or beat gestures (F1 (1, 18)0.02, ns; F2 (1,
19)0.08, ns). Given the preponderance of representa-
tional gestures in our corpus and the lack of adaptation
in beat or metanarrative gestures across retellings, the
observed effects for size and iconic precision seem to be
primarily due to adaptation in the motoric execution of
representational gestures.
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Appendix 1
The 20 narrative elements for the Road Runner cartoon included for
gesture coding
1. Road Runner is being chased by Coyote/Road Runner and
Coyote are running (in the desert).
2. Coyote is holding a fork and a knife and has a napkin around
his neck.
3. Coyote lunges forward with fork and knife, trying to stab
Road Runner.
4. Road Runner says ‘‘Beep Beep’’, takes off; Coyote misses
Road Runner. (RR is too fast.)
5. Coyote attaches boxing glove (on spring), (on metal band), on
rock.
6. The boxing glove initially does not move. The rock is
propelled backwards.
7. Coyote is pushed backwards by the rock and is smashed
against the side of the cliff.
8. The boxing glove is propelled backwards and punches Coyote
in the face.
9. Coyote steps on tightrope, holding the anvil.
10. The tightrope stretches all the way to the ground, bringing
Coyote all the way down to the ground.
11. Road Runner comes and stops in front of Coyote.
12. Coyote drops anvil on the ground (to go run after Road Runner).
13. Coyote is propelled up in the air by the tightrope.
14. Coyote pulls the string on his backpack to release the
parachute.
15. Coyote grabs some aspirin pills and pops them into his mouth.
16. Coyote falls and hits the ground.
17. Coyote is seen chasing after Road Runner. Road Runner runs
into the ‘‘Old Cactus Mine’’.
18. The zigzag path splits into an upper path and a straight path.
The green light (Road Runner) takes the upper path while the
red light (Coyote) takes the straight path below/Road Runner
loses the Coyote.
19. Coyote lights up a match.
20. The cactuses fly up into the air and fall back down spelling
‘‘YIPE!’’.
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